OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence Integration into Resource Process and Acquisition Lifecycle

Intelligence Strategy, Programs and Resources

Briefing to DAU
April 7, 2015

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Improving Intelligence Integration in Acquisition

Intelligence Strategy, Programs and Resources

Agenda:

- BLUF
- Why do you care?
- What is the IC?
- How do you make it work for
- What's changed/changing?
- Way Ahead


Okay, now listen up. Nobody gets in here without answering the following question: What is an LMDP, when do you submit one and to whom?

Program Manager's nightmare

Improving Intelligence Integration in Acquisition

Bottom Line Up Front:

- **"Houston, we have a problem"**
  - **JSF brought threat and IMD issue to forefront**
- **The light you see is not the end of the tunnel —its a train coming**
  - **Next generation weapons reliance on up to date threat and intelligence supportability is increasing**
  - **Resources anticipated to be flat or declining**
- **Definition of Insanity—Doing the same thing and expecting different results**
- **USD(I), AT&L, DIA, Services, and ODNI working to implement solutions this year**

DONE RIGHT: IMPROVES COMBAT CAPABILITIES, EFFICIENCIES, SAVINGS

Why Do You Care as a Program Manager?

- **AT&L Vision:** Drive the capability to defeat any adversary on any battlefield
- **Your Challenge:** Deliver those capabilities on cost, schedule, and performance, often for long term programs in a rapidly changing environment
- **JSF Case Study:** Threat and IMD

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Taking the mystery out of Intelligence:

- **Like the Acquisition Community, the IC is big and complex**

- **Operates as a Federation in addressing your needs:**
  - **DIA manages the Federated Enterprise**
  - **Your Service Intelligence Chief is y**

- **Rules of Thumb in dealing with**
  - **Resource Constrained**
  - **Lead time is critical**
  - **Bad news doesn't get better with**



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Improving Intelligence Integration in Acquisition

Intelligence Strategy, Programs and Resources

USD(I) coordinates intel for Acquisition/Requirements

- **Within Agencies**
- **Across Agencies**
- **National & Defense Intelligence**

How do you make the IC work for your Program?

Key Authoritative Documents:

- DoDD 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, 20030512, cert current 20071120
- DoDI 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System, 20150107
- DoDD 5250.01, Management of Intelligence Mission Data in DoD Acquisition, 20130122
- CJCSI 5123.01, JROC Charter
- CJCSI 3170.01I, Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System, 20150123
- JCIDSM, Manual for the Operation of the JCIDS, 20150212
- DoDD 5240.02, Counterintelligence
- DoDM 5200.01, Information Security Program

Best Practice—Engage with intel early and often; at a minimum, meet milestone requirements

What's being done to improve the process?

- **Expanding focus of DODD 5250.01 from just Intel Mission Data to the Big 10—Threat plus 9 JCIDS Intelligence Supportability Categories:**
  - Intelligence Manpower Support
  - Intelligence Resource Support
  - Intelligence Planning and Operations Support
    - Planning and Direction
    - Collection (Includes SIGINT, HUMINT, MASINT, GEOINT support requirements)
    - Processing and Exploitation
    - Analysis and Production
    - Dissemination and Integration
    - Evaluation and Feedback
  - Targeting Support
  - Intelligence Mission Data Support
  - Warning Support
  - Space Intelligence Support
  - Counterintelligence Support
  - Intelligence Training Support
- **3 Key Focus areas: Threat, Intel Mission Data, Counterintelligence**

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Recognizing & Addressing IMD Demands

Intelligence Strategy, Programs and Resources

What's being done to improve the process? (continued)

- Coordination and alignment of DoD Efforts across Acquisition, Intelligence, and Requirements Communities

- Guiding Principles:
  - No new bureaucracy
  - Must leverage existing governance structures

Cross-domain efforts by Champion Governance

Intelligence	Acquisition	Requirements
• RMD	• BBP 3.0	• IRCO Certification
• CIG/IMD	• 5000.02	• JCIDS MANUAL
• DIAP efforts	• Agora (Market)	• JCIDS CJCSI
• 5250 Rewrite	• Acq Intel Spt Agmt (AISA)	
• CIP DTM	• Training	
• DAG Ch 8 rewrite		
• DoD Performance		


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Intelligence Support to Acquisition
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Intelligence, Acquisition & Requirements Initiatives
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Improving Intelligence Integration in Acquisition

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

mportance of Threat to Development:

- **DIA coordination office – TLA-3**
- **Capabilities** are developed against the adversaries' capability
- **Threat(s)** can change during the development cycle
  - The enemy can develop new threats faster than we can develop new systems
  - Potential enemies access our media and exploit unprotected repositories of Defense related information
  - Potential adversaries have observed US capabilities in the field after more than a decade of hostilities
  - They know a great deal about the capabilities we employ and the major systems we are developing
- **Threat information** must be updated at CDD and CPD
- **Critical Intelligence Parameters (CIPs)** must be identified early

Critical Intelligence Parameters:

- **Definition:** CIPs are those key performance thresholds of foreign threat systems which, if exceeded, could compromise the mission effectiveness of the US system in development.
  - Identified in the System Threat Assessment Report (STAR); monitored by the IC; Breaches declared when applicable adversary threat advances observed
- **CIP Breach Process:**
  - Breach reviews use similar procedures to JROC/JCB tripwire reviews; intent is for Risk Mitigation Teams to address breach impacts on capability and associated programs
  - Strategic Program CIP Breach briefed to Force Application (FA) WG, FA FCB
    - CIP Breach did not present significant concern for sponsor or program
    - Review of the breach provided excellent opportunity to test and follow procedures
    - Mitigation Team participation included JS J8, DIA TLA-3, MSIC, NASIC, and JS J283
  - Incorporated throughout JCIDS Manual; OSD Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) in coordination for incorporation in acquisition process
- **IRCO and DIA facilitating CIP Breach inclusion in FCB capability reviews**

Critical Intelligence Parameters

- Challenge
  - No DoD policy or guidance on CIPs existed
    - Only guidance in DIA Instruction related to STAR validation for large programs
  - No standardization across programs
    - Notification process not mandatory nor consistent
    - Programs self-police when threat exceeds parameters
- Status
  - CIP working group was established (JS, AT&L, USDI, DIA, Service Intel Centers)
  - New policy language (Directive-Type Memo) has been drafted, process defined
  - CJCSI 3170/JCIDS manual updated and made several improvements:
    - Identification of CIPs during CBAs when they are driving the capability requirements.
    - Threat Summary section of ICDs include identification of CIPs; CDDs & CPDs include summary of CIPs associated with KPPs, KSAs, and APAs.
    - CIPs as a component of Warning Support assessed in Intelligence Supportability content of CDDs and CPDs.
    - Staffing of Tripwires and CIP Breach Reviews.
    - Review of CIPs as part of Intelligence Certification
- Next Steps
  - BBP 3.0 action to provide formal DTM package to USD(AT&L) for approval then processing (usually 90-day process)

LMDP Development and Assessment Process


Phase I – Acquisition Program
▪ Identifies all known IMD requirements allowing scalability based on current milestone
•Tasks IPCs to provide IMD availability, gaps, & costs to the Program Office
• Ensures
Requirements Identification
Repeat as necessary throughout lifecycle
Risk Assessment
Phase V – Acquisition Program
▪ Determines risk, appropriate courses of action
▪Develops IMD cost & sourcing strategy to identify DoD C, other
IMD Production PR:
•Tasks IPCs to provide IMD based on risk assessment
Acquisition Community
Intelligence Community
Requirement Review
Cross Program Analysis
Phase II – IMDC
▪ Ensures completeness and actionability
▪ Evaluates Request to determine which SICs/IPCs should assess needs
▪ Brokers IPC/SIC tasking and tracks
Intel Availability Assessment
Phase IV – IMDC
▪ Analyzes shortfalls, provides consolidated feedback to programs
▪ Identifies common IMD requirements
across programs and services
Phase III – IPC
▪ Assesses gaps, estimates shortfall costs using standardized and transparent methods
Process is:
• Scalable
• Iterative
•
Functional Area Governance
C&P
EWIR
GEOINT
OOB
Sigs

Coming Improvements: IMARS System

- The IMD Management, Analysis and Reporting System (IMARS) is a tool to facilitate the identification, assessment and analysis of IMD requirements
- IMARS saves IMD requirements and requirements, making it easier to update the LMDP throughout the program lifecycle
- IMARS v1.2 (IOC Version) expected completion ~ Sep 15
  - IMD supportability assessment & cross program analysis capabilities
- IMARS v2.0 (FOC Version) complete ~Sep 16
  - Adds time-phased IMD requirements



Resource Management Decision Directs Three Actions:

- Joint Staff–Conduct a Capabilities Based Assessment of IMD production capability requirements, linking IMD to KPPs
- USD(I)–Work with ODNI and Mil Depts to discretely identify/ track resources to satisfy IMD production, develop business process for appropriate allocations
- USD(AT&L)—Develop a Governance Structure – identify, prioritize and address resourcing and prioritization of cradle to grave IMD requirements

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Conceptual Governance Structure
(IMD – THREAT – Counterintelligence Focus)

Executive Steering Group -- replaces DoDD 5250.01's IMD Senior Steering Group (IMD SSG) and IMD Oversight Board (IMD OB)

- Address Intelligence integration topics with regard to capability development and sustainment
- Prioritize DoD Acq related Intelligence issues and submits for consideration to existing decision bodies
  - Risk Analysis, IMD POA, prioritization, resourcing, etc.

Action Group -- evolution of the existing IMD Working Group (IMD WG)

- Coordinate/Synchronize Intel
- Integration issues
- Manage/facilitate AISA/CPA
- Clearing house Intel/Acq equities
- Service 2s, 3s and SAEs
- involvement critical
- Training/Outreach



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IMD Shortfall Deep Dive

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- Data exists for F-35 IMD requirements/shortfalls for Blocks 2/3, AORs 1-4, FY15; *No update will be completed in time for the FY 2017 Issue Paper*

- IMDC has requirements/gaps assessed for 9 programs, using CAPE approved costing methodology; up to 8 additional programs may be captured

Assessed LMDPs:

PAC-3 (Army)
IFPC (Army)
AMDR (2013 & 2014) (Navy)
SDB-II (USAF)
F-35 (2013 & 2014) (Joint)
RQ-4 Global Hawk (USAF)
RQ-21 Blackjack (USMC)

Identified for RMD:

B2 DMS (USAF)
EPAWSS(USAF)
NGJ (Navy)
GROWLER (Navy)
LCS Mission Module (Navy)
CREW (USMC)
DCGS-A (Army)
IGSSRC (Army)

The IMD shortfall is Department wide

Counterintelligence Challenges:

- **IRCO observations regarding CI requirements and supportability** in capability development
  - **Inconsistent and insufficient identification of CI support** needed to mitigate foreign threat vulnerabilities and provide program protection
    - **Lack of supporting threat assessments and plans** – Multi-Discipline CI Threat Assessment, Technology Transfer Risk Assessment, Supply Chain Threat Assessment, CI Support Plan – augment the Program Protection Plan (PPP)
    - **Insufficient Sponsor understanding of CI** support issues
    - **Supporting assessments and plans** are primarily acquisition requirements; however, **serve to inform CI support category requirements**
  - **Possible capacity issues** across the Intelligence Community (IC) to process threat assessments
  - Assessment complements the USD(I) and AT&L Joint Acquisition Protection Exploitation Cell (JAPEC) task to protect against loss of technical information
- **Sponsor / PM should initiate CI-related vulnerability assessments early in development**
  - Take into account shared (foreign partner) production and Supply Chain Risk

Take Away:

- Multiple initiatives across Acquisition, Intelligence, and Requirements Communities to improve processes and responsiveness
- Key focus areas: Threat, Intel Mission Data, and Counterintelligence
- Automated Intelligence Support Agreement under development:
  - Documents program intelligence requirements and shared expectations
  - Under development at this time; expected out in FY 2016
- Best Practice: Early Engagement and Regular Dialogue

Backup Slides

New CIP Process